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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES WILLARD HEARN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs- Case No. 16940 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus challenges 
Utah's right to force petitioner to finish a sentence, which 
was inadvertantly begun in 1970, after he completes the sentence 
he is presently serving in the United States penitentiary in 
M~rion, Illinois. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The petition was filed in the First Judicial District 
Court of Utah. A hearing was held on February 15, 1980 with 
the Honorable Venoy Christofferson presiding. Judge Christoffers, 
denied the petition on the grounds that the Court did not have 
jurisdiction to issue the Writ of Habeas Corpus when the 
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petitioner was not imprisoned in the State of Utah. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the denial of the petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS \ 
In 1970 petitioner, while imprisoned at the 
Washington State Penitentiary, requested that a final 
disposition be made of charges against him in Box Elder 
County, Utah. In accordance with the provisions of the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers (hereafter IAD) petitioner 
was sent to Utah where he was tried and convicted for robbery 
and sentenced to not less than 25 years in prison. (R. 42). 
Petitioner had served a few months of this sentence at the 
Utah State Prison when Washington notified Utah that, 
according to the provisions of the IAD, petitioner should 
have been returned to Washington. Before returning petitioner 
to Washington, Judge Christofferson informed him that he 
would be required to return to Utah, after he completed his 
Washington sentence. 
On April 9, 1976, petitioner was transferred from 
Washington State Penitentiary to the United States Penitentiaey 
in Marion, Illinois, where he presently is serving time. 
After the transfer, Utah placed a detainer on petitioner for 
his Utah sentence. Petitioner filed a petition for Writ of 
-2-
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Habeas Corpus in the First Judicial District of Utah, which 
was denied on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction. 
It is from this denial that petitioner appeals. 
Petitioner asserts that this action is being 
brought under Title 28 Section 2254(b) United States Code 
Ann., which provides that a prisoner can seek federal relief 
under the statute if he has exhausted all his state remedies. 
Respondent does not treat this issue because it is inappropriate 
in this forum. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PETITIONER CANNOT INSTITUTE A PRO-
CEEDING UNDER RULES 65B (f) and (i) 
BECAUSE HE IS NOT PRESENTLY IMPRIS-
ONED IN UTAH. 
Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
any person imprisoned in the penitentiary 
or county jail under a commitment of any 
court, . . . who asserts that in any pro-
ceedings which resulted in his commitment 
there was a substantial denial of his rights 
under the Constitution of the United -States 
or of the State of Utah, or both, may 
institute a proceeding under this rule. 
Rule 65B(i) requires that a person be imprisoned in 
Utah before he can institute a proceeding under the rule. At 
present, petitioner is imprisoned in Marion Federal Prison, in 
Marion, Illinois, and therefore he does not have standing to 
challenge the legality of a sentence, which is not presently 
-3-
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being imposed on him. Respondent asserts that this Court 
does not have jurisdiction to issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
when petitioner is not presently being restrained in the 
State of Utah. 
POINT II 
REQUIRING PETITIONER TO COMPLETE THE 
UNEXPIRED PORTION OF HIS SENTENCE IS 
NOT A VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS. 
Petitioner relies on a number of cases to support 
his allegation that his constitutional rights would be violated 
if he is forced to return to Utah to complete the unexpired 
oortion of his sentence. ~However, the issue raised bv petitionel 
has not ripened into a controversy worthy of adjudication 
because petitioner is not presently being restrained by Utah. 
Therefore, there is not sufficient immediacy to petitioner's 
claim to make it appropriate for judicial determination. Even 
if it were appropriate to consider the issue raised by 
petitioner the facts of the cases he cites and the instant 
case are not analogous. In fact, the instant case is so far 
removed from the cases petitioner cites that the principles of 
law adopted therein are wholly inapplicable to the instant 
case. 
Petitioner's transfer, which was executed under the 
IAD, is different from the prisoner transfers in the cases 
he cites. Petitioner cites cases where asylum states lost 
-4-
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jurisdiction over prisoners by extraditing them to other 
states, where new sentences were imposed on them. In other 
cases cited by petitioner, prisoners released by mistake 
from prison, due to no fault of their own were forced to 
return and complete their sentences. In this case Utah 
took temporary custody of petitioner to make a final 
disposition of the charges pending against him. The transaction 
was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the IAD. 
In the cases petitioner cites the asylum states waived 
jurisdiction over the prisoners by extraditing them or 
releasinq them from Prison. Here, Washinqton did not waive 
iurisdiction over petitioner, but merelv allowed Utah to 
have temPorarv custodv of him until he was tried and sentenced. 
Furthermore, in each case cited by petitioner, it 
was the asylum state that was trying to reacquire jurisdiction 
over the prisoners. In this case Utah was the receiving state 
and as such was required by the provisions of the IAD to return 
petitioner to Washington after a final disposition was made 
of the charges against h.im. The situation in the instant 
case is the reverse of the situations in the cases petitioner 
cites. To hold as petitioner suggests that Utah waived 
jurisdiction over petitioner by returning him to the sending 
state would defeat the purpose of the IAD. Any state, after 
it tried a prisoner from another jurisdiction, would be 
faced with a dilemma. 
-5-
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It could return the prisoner and lose the right 
to impose a sentence on him, or it could immediately impose 
the sentence and violate the provisions of the IAD. Therefore, 
it is implicit that after a prisoner completes his sentence 
in the sending state that the receiving state can reacquire 
jurisdiction over him to impose on him his sentence. 
Finally, the cases that petitioner cites demonstrate 
situation~ where reincarceration of the prisoner was inconsist~ 
with the principles of justice. However, petitioner in this 
case has failed to show how forcing him to serve his sentence 
would be violating his co~stitutional rights. 
The case of O'Glesby v. Leeke, 210 S.E.2d 232 
(So. Carolina 1974), states that a sentence can be satisfied 
by death, service of the required time, or relief therefrom 
by competent authority. Because petitioner is not pres·ently 
imprisoned in Utah the issue he raises is not ripe for 
adjudication. Therefore, there i·s nO -competent authority to 
excuse petitioner from the service of his sentence at this 
time, nor are the cases cited by petitioner relevant to the 
issue he has raised. 
POINT III 
PETITIONER SHOULD NOT BE EXCUSED FROM 
COMPLETING THE UNEXPIRED PORTION OF HIS 
SENTENCE ON THE GROUNDS HE BEGAN SERVICE 
OF HIS SENTENCE BEFORE HE WAS RETURNED 
TO WASHINGTON. 
-6-
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The Interstate Agreement on Detainers is found in 
Section 77-65-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
Article V(e) of the IAD provides, "at the earliest practicable 
time consonant with the purpose of this agreement, the 
prisoner shall be returned to the sending state." Petitioner 
alleges that after he was convicted and sentenced in Utah he 
began serving his sentence at the Utah State Prison instead 
of being returned to Washington. However, petitioner should 
not be excused from serving his sentence on the grounds that 
Utah inadvertantly detained petitioner before returning him 
to Washington. 
Article IX of the IAD begins, "This agreement shall 
be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purpose." 
The purpose of IAD, as stated in Article I, is to provide for 
the orderly and expeditious disposition of charges and detainers 
outstanding against prisoners because these charges obstruct 
programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. The facts 
outlined by petitioner indicate that the purpose of the IAD 
was effectuated. A final disposition was made of the charges 
against petitioner before he was returned to Washington. Even 
though Utah failed to immediately return petitioner to 
Washington, this does not entitle him to be excused from 
serving his sentence because the purpose of the IAD was 
effectuated. 
-7-
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Saunders v. State, 397 A. 2d 548 (Del. 1979), parallei 
the instant case in that the defendant sought habeas corpus 
relief for ,Delaware's violation of the IAD. In Saunders, 
the defendant had been sent to Delaware, convicted, and 
sentenced to 14 years in the state penitentiary. This 
conviction was reversed, but in the interim between the 
conviction and reversal the defendant was convicted of 
murder. The defendant claimed that he should have been 
returned to the federal authorities after his conviction 
and not tried on new charges, which were not the basis for 
the original detainer. The Court rejected this claim and 
dismissed his petition because the defendant failed to 
particularize which section of the IAD had been violated 
and because he failed to demonstrate how Delaware's delay 
iri returning him had violated the policies and purposes of 
the IAD. 
Furthermore, petitioner is not entitled to relief 
because petitioner was not prejudiced, nor were his rights 
violated by Utah's inadvertent noncompliance with Article 
V(e). This Court outlined in Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 
528 (Utah 1978), when a writ of habeas corpus can be used: 
"the rule may be used in exigent circumstances • • • or where 
there has been such unfairness or failure to accord due process 
of law that it would be wholly unconscionable not to· re-examine 
-8-
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the conviction." Id. at 530. The New York District Court 
in Williams v. Dalsheim, 480 F.Supp. 1049 (1979), denied a 
habeas corpus petition, which claimed the IAD had been 
violated. The Court stated: 
Since the heart of the agreement is 
to protect a prisoner's rehabilitative 
opportunities, a violation should be 
considered in a federal collateral 
proceeding in terms of prejudice it 
causes a prisoner. 
Id. at 1054. Petitioner's claims in the instant case do 
not rise to the required level of seriousness which would 
make the granting of this petition appropriate. Nor do the 
facts presented by petitioner indicate that his status at 
the Washington State Prison was prejudiced by his temporary 
incarceration in Utah before he was returned to Washington. 
Petitioner alleges that the detainer Utah has 
lodged against him at the federal prison in Marion, Illinois, 
had a deleterious effect on his parole hearing. However, 
this fact is not relevant to the question of whether Utah 
can force petitioner to complete his sentence. Any complaint 
involving the manner in which his parole hearing was 
conducted should be brought to the attention of the federal 
authorities in Illinois. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent asserts that the order of the court 
below denying the petition for a Writ of Habeas "Corpus 
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should be affirmed for the following reasons. First, 
because petitioner is not presently imprisoned in Utah 
the issue he raises is not ripe for judicial determination, 
nor can he seek post-conviction relief under Rules 65B(f) 
and (i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.. Second, petitioner's 
allegations do not make out a deprivation of his constitu-
tional rights. Third, petitioner was not prejudiced by 
Utah's temporary noncompliance with Article V(e) of the 
IAD. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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